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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
Earth’s temperature has increased by 0.85 degrees Celsius since 1880.1 This 
rise in temperature is best explained by the increased amount of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere.2 In fact, United States GHG 
emissions have increased by about 5% since 1990.3 The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) reports that increased GHGs in the atmosphere 
can be attributed to anthropogenic causes such as the accelerated consumption 
of fossil fuels in the electricity production through burning coal and natural 
gas, as well as an increase in burning petroleum based fuel for 
transportation.4 These uses produce excessive amounts of carbon dioxide, 
as current levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are at an all-time 
high.5  The United States, a global economic powerhouse, produces more 
than 19% of the Earth’s total GHG emissions, second only to China.6 As 
the amount of GHGs in the atmosphere continues to increase, the threat 
of climate change has become a prevalent public concern. 
While skeptics regard the rise in global temperature as a mere natural 
and periodical increase and posit that the climate will eventually stabilize 
itself, climate change science starkly disagrees.7 Climate change has been 
largely attributed to a rise in anthropogenic GHG emissions. As such, the 
United Nations has become a key resource to explore appropriate avenues 
to address the problem. GHG emissions reductions have been the hot topic 
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
 1.  Lisa V. Alexander, et. al., Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 1, 5 (2013), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
 2.  See id at 13, 15. 
 3.  Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html. 
 4.  See id. 
 5.  National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 11, 
2013), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html. 
 6.  Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 9, 
2013),  http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html. 
 7.  See id. 
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(UNFCCC).8 The UNFCCC’s framework-protocol model encourages 
developed countries that are major GHG emitters, such as the United 
States and the European Union, to take the lead in reducing the amount of 
GHGs in the atmosphere.9 In a treaty agreement founded upon concepts 
of international law, both developed and developing nations have adopted 
differentiated responsibilities to address the issue of climate change on a 
global scale.10 However, much like many issues of international public 
concern, the varying level of commitment to reduce GHG emissions is 
disconcerting. 
The Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty adopted in 1997, “represents 
the most significant, specific commitments that major emitters have taken on 
climate change.”11 The Kyoto Protocol included a broad range of 
signatories and contained specific, numerical emissions reductions targets 
aimed at combating climate change.12 However, despite its participation 
in commitment negotiations as well as the commitment of other industrialized 
nations to reduce their emissions, the United States never brought the 
treaty to the Senate for ratification, ultimately limiting the Kyoto Protocol’s 
power, reach, and impact.13 Since the international realm of GHG emissions 
reductions is a difficult avenue to address climate change, the increasing 
public concern for a healthy and habitable environment hinges upon the 
efforts of domestic leaders and policymakers. 
In recent years, the United States federal government  has begun 
addressing climate change through GHG emissions regulations.14 The 
U.S. has considered various economic tactics to reduce the amount of 
GHGs in the atmosphere, including implementing a cap-and-trade system 
that would create a carbon market requiring GHG emitters to pay a price 
for their carbon consumption. Instead of drafting new statutes to regulate 
GHGs in the atmosphere, the United States started developing regulation 
under the Clean Air Act of 1970.15 In the 2007 Supreme Court case 
 
 8.  GHG Inventory Data, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, available at http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/items/3800.php. 
 9.  See HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND 
POLICY 69 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2012). 
 10.  See id. at 70. 
 11.  Id. at 80. 
 12.  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 32. 
 13.  See HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, supra note 9, at 80. 
 14.  See National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, supra note 5 at 1. 
 15.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671 (West 2014). 
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Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that the Clean Air Act authorized 
the EPA to regulate GHGs emitted from motor vehicles.”16  In American 
Electric Power v. Connecticut (2011), the high Court reinforced 
Massachusetts v. EPA by holding that regulatory suits under the Clean 
Air Act were an appropriate way of influencing the current federal 
approach to climate change.17 Because these landmark cases have paved 
the way for addressing climate change through litigation strategies, they 
have also given rise to many other legal claims that have lead to stricter 
GHG emissions regulations.  One such legal claim is the right to a habitable 
and clean atmosphere, which arises under the common law public trust 
doctrine. 
II.  THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The concept of communal ownership of public spaces dates back to the 
Roman Empire, where Emperor Justinian wrote, “By the law of nature these 
things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the shores of the sea. . . All rivers and ports are public: hence 
the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers, is common to all men.”18 
Professor Mary Christina Wood describes the public trust doctrine to be 
“a declaration of public property rights as originally and inherently 
reserved through the peoples’ social contract with their  sovereign 
governments.”19 This social contract creates a fiduciary relationship 
between the public and their government, and requires the government, as 
trustee, to protect natural assets for the beneficiaries of the trust: present 
and future generations of citizens.20 As the United States Supreme Court held 
in Geer v. Connecticut, the legislature is the primary trustee of the public 
trust doctrine.21 Therefore, the judiciary, whose role is to determine the 
constitutionality of the ’legislation, must ensure that the legislature fulfills 
its duty to maintain the public trust for the beneficiary. The maintenance 
and protection of natural assets within the public trust must rank high 
amongst the essential purposes of government because of the benefit that 
these assets provide to society.22 Because these assets are scarce in nature, 
 
 16.  Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
 17.  See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
 18.  Caesar Flavius Justinian, Book II, Title I, Of the Different Kind of Things; And 
The Acquisition of Property, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 50 (William Grapel trans., The 
Law Book Exchange Ltd. 2008). 
 19.  Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the World, FIDUCIARY DUTY 
AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 106 (Ken Goghill, Chalres Samford,Tim Smith, eds., Ashgate 
Pub (Aust.) 2012), available at http://law. uoregon.edu/assets/facultydocs/mwood/atmo.pdf. 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529, 533–34 (1896). 
 22.  See Wood, supra note 19, at 107. 
CASTILLO(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2016  9:38 AM 
[VOL. 6:  221, 2014–15] Climate Change & The Public Trust Doctrine 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 225 
if left unprotected, they may be subject to selfish exploitation by private 
parties, ultimately leading to chaos and societal collapse.23 
The Supreme Court, through its interpretation in Illinois Central Railroad 
v. Illinois, has acknowledged and upheld the applicability of the public trust 
doctrine, but has largely left it up to the states to implement.24  Though rooted 
and often litigated in the context of lands beneath navigable waters within 
the boundaries of particular states, the scope of the public trust doctrine 
may be expanded and applied to a variety of states’ natural resources. 
With the steady rise of the Earth’s global temperature over the past 
century, the threat of climate change has raised concerns regarding the 
stability of the Earth’s atmosphere for future generations.  Thus, 
propositions to include the environment as a natural resource to be held 
within the public trust have been frequently considered.  This paper will 
discuss current legal claims that seek to expand the public trust doctrine’s 
scope to include the Earth’s atmosphere and evaluate the ability of these 
claims to hold the government responsible, as a trustee, for maintaining a 
habitable atmosphere for the public as well as for future generations. 
Through analyzing the viability of public trust doctrine claims at the 
federal level, as well as examining current litigation in the state of New 
Mexico, this paper concludes that the task of including the atmosphere in 
the public trust doctrine is an uphill battle with many legal challenges. 
Although the Supreme Court has entertained public trust doctrine 
claims, it has also allowed the states discretion to determine whether 
particular resources could be included within the definition of the public 
trust.25 Because each state has its own constitutional language regarding 
its public trust, the likelihood of expanding the public trust doctrine to 
protect the atmosphere varies considerably. Thus, the viability of legal 
claims pursued in civil litigation requires a case-by-case analysis. One 
particular instance of ongoing atmospheric trust litigation at the state level 
is currently occurring in New Mexico. This paper analyzes the arguments 
presented during litigation, and concludes that plaintiffs must restructure 
their appeal to show sufficient causation in order to expand the public trust 
to include the atmosphere. 
 
 23.  See id. at 107. 
 24.  Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455–56 (1892). 
 25.  See infra note 31. 
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III.  BASIS FOR EXPANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A.  The Public Trust Doctrine at the Federal Level 
The common law public trust doctrine was first recognized by the 
Supreme Court in its 1892 decision Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.26 
In this case, at issue was the private possession of lands beneath navigable 
waters in the state of Michigan.27  Often utilized for public interstate 
commerce, these waters were held under the license of the crown, which 
exercised exclusive dominion over them and insured freedom in their 
use.28 The Court applied the common law public trust doctrine and held 
that when property is public in nature and used for purposes in which the 
entire public is interested, such property becomes part of the public trust 
for the enjoyment of the people and shall be free from interference with 
private parties.29 In this sweeping decision, the Supreme Court entrusted 
the state governments to hold all navigable waters and the land beneath 
them in a public trust for the benefit of the people.30 
The Court considered the public trust doctrine again in Geer v. 
Connecticut, with regard to state ownership of wild game animals. As part 
of its discussion of the state’s authority to enact preservation regulations, the 
Court reasoned: 
[T]he development of free institutions had led to the recognition of the fact that 
the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common ownership, 
is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit 
of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government as 
distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from 
the public good.31 
While the common law public trust doctrine has been acknowledged at 
the federal level, the Supreme Court in PPL v. Montana recently noted 
that in the public trust case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the 
Court was interpreting and applying Illinois state law, thus concluding that 
“the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.”32 Furthermore, the 
Montana Court held that “[u]nder accepted principles of federalism, the 
 
 26.  See Illinois, supra note 24, at 453–54. 
 27.  See id. at 433. 
 28.  See id. at 457. 
 29.  See id. at 459. 
 30.  See id. at 450, 458. 
 31.  Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. at 525; but see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 
322 (1979) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut by holding that the general rule that applied 
to state regulation of natural resources should be similarly applied to the ownership of wild 
animals); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (denying the state’s claimed 
ownership of migratory bird under international treaty). 
 32.  P.P.L v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012). 
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states retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over 
water within their borders.”33  Therefore, the applicability of the 
common law public trust doctrine is ultimately left to the states to 
implement and adjudicate.34 
B.  The Public Trust Doctrine at the State Level 
Many states have directly incorporated the public trust doctrine into their 
state Constitutions, guaranteeing citizens public ownership of certain public 
areas and recognizing the state’s responsibility to protect the air, land, and 
water within its boundaries. These states effectively expanded the common 
law public trust doctrine to encompass natural resources that were not 
explicitly addressed at the federal level. For example, Article I, § 27 of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public 
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet 
to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.35 
Similarly, Article IX, § 1 of the Louisiana Constitution provides: 
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, 
historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, 
and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and 
welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.36 
Perhaps most explicit, is the language in Article XI, § 1 of the Hawaii 
Constitution, which provides: 
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political 
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural 
resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall 
promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent 
with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All 
public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the 
people.37 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  PA. CONST., art. I, § 27. 
 36.  LA. CONST., art. IX, § 1 
 37.  HAW. CONST., art. XI, § 1. 
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While some states incorporate the public trust doctrine into their State 
Constitutions, others provide for the public trust through legislative 
enactments to fit the needs of the public. Maine explicitly acknowledges 
the public trust doctrine as “a doctrine reflective of the customs, traditions, 
heritage and habits of the Maine people,” emphasizing the doctrine’s far-
reaching scope.38  Maine also requires the government to protect natural 
resources that are “essential to the health and welfare of the Maine people.”39 
In Florida, the state legislature guarantees that citizens “shall be assured 
public ownership of natural areas for purposes of maintaining this state’s 
unique natural resources; protecting air, land and water quality.”40 
Whereas those states have codified the public trust doctrine into legislation, 
others have looked to the state judiciary to elucidate the doctrine’s reach 
and potential for expansion. While some states limit the doctrine’s 
applicability to land beneath navigable waters, many jurisdictions allow 
for its expansion to other common resources that benefit the public. For 
example, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that “[t]he public trust, by its 
very nature, does not remain fixed for all time, but must conform to 
changing needs and circumstances.”41 Similarly, a New Jersey court held 
that “the public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not 
be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet 
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to 
benefit.”42 Even the Supreme Court of California made the explicit  
determination to expand the scope of the public trust to include “the purity 
of the air.”43 Given the flexible nature of the doctrine, and the lack of 
federal authority limiting the scope of the public trust, the public trust 
doctrine has become an avenue to hold state governments accountable for 
protecting the natural resources within its boundaries. 
With the growing concern for climate change and its potential harms, 
many environmental advocates have pursued legal action to coerce state 
governments into taking a more active role in regulating GHGs emissions, 
especially since the failure of the Kyoto Protocol. As such, this article 
argues that civil litigation under the common law public trust doctrine is 
a viable legal mechanism to prompt governments to more adequately 
address climate change.  If litigants successfully prove a basis for expanding 
the public trust doctrine to include the atmosphere, they may thus create 
 
 38.  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 571 (2014). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 259.032 (West 2014). 
 41.  In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000). 
 42.  Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 
(N.J. 1972). 
 43.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 704, 719 
(Cal 1983). 
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a fiduciary duty in the state government to protect the atmosphere from 
GHGs that strongly contribute to the rise in global temperature. Through 
atmospheric trust litigation, state judiciaries have the power to determine 
whether their legislative and executive branches have breached their duty 
to maintain the public trust, and if breached, require state legislatures and 
executives to create and implement effective environmental policies that 
will ensure the protection of the earth’s atmosphere for generations to 
come. 
IV.  THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST: ANALYSIS ON THE CURRENT   
LITIGATION IN NEW MEXICO 
A notable example of current atmospheric trust litigation is taking place in 
New Mexico.  Akilah Sanders-Reed, through her parents Carol and John-
Sanders Reed, brought suit against the State of New Mexico and Governor 
of New Mexico for breaching their duties to maintain the public trust with 
respect to the atmosphere.44 In their complaint, the aggrieved plaintiffs 
requested that the court declare the public trust doctrine operative in the State 
of New Mexico and to further declare the atmosphere’s inclusion within the 
public trust.45  With hopes in establishing such a duty, plaintiffs sought to 
create an enforceable cause of action against State officials who failed to 
limit GHG emissions within the state.46 
This section is an in-depth analysis of Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, as it 
is recent, pivotal and potentially influential case that can determine the 
future of atmospheric trust litigation. First, this section will provide an 
overview of Plaintiff’s allegations in Sanders v. Martinez and discuss the 
current New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board regulations that 
apply to Plaintiff’s claims. Next, this section will discuss New Mexico’s 
denial of plaintiffs’ allegations and its responses in litigation. Finally, 
because the New Mexico government was ultimately granted summary 
judgment, this section will also analyze Plaintiff’s ability to appeal. 
A.  Plaintiff’s Allegations 
The New Mexico Constitution, Art. XX, § 21 provides: 
 
 44.  Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Sanders-Reed 
v. Martinez (N.M. Dist. Feb. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 8898923 [hereinafter Sanders-Reed]. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
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The protection of the state’s beautiful and healthful environment is hereby 
declared to be of fundamental importance to the public interest, health, safety and 
the general welfare. The legislature shall provide for control of pollution and 
control of despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources of this state, 
consistent with the use and development of these resources for the maximum benefit 
of the people.47 
The above language illustrates that the quality of the air would be regulated 
by the government for the maximum benefit of the people.  While there is 
no direct reference to a doctrine of public trust, the New Mexico 
Constitution iterates the ideals behind the common law doctrine by entrusting 
the state with protecting the natural resources within its boundaries for the 
public’s benefit.  The use of the word “shall” is significant because it 
delegates significant responsibility to New Mexico’s state government to 
control and regulate air pollution.  Thus, if the legislature fails to adequately 
regulate the quality of the atmosphere to the point where poor air quality 
or increased global temperature causes harm to citizens, the government 
breaches its duty to maintain the public trust. While no New Mexico court 
has interpreted this particular provision of its Constitution to either expand 
or limit its interpretational reach, the plaintiffs argued that the legislature’s 
intent was obvious: New Mexico has a vested interest in protecting the 
state’s natural resources for public benefit, and therefore has required the 
state to regulate, maintain and control the air.48 
In Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, plaintiffs asserted that the public trust 
doctrine is inherently recognized in Article XX, § 21 of the New Mexico 
Constitution, which requires the legislature to protect the state’s natural 
resources for the benefit of the people.49  They also contended that the 
legislature had implicitly recognized the public trust doctrine through its 
statutes by declaring that surface waters within the state belong to the 
public for its beneficial use.50 Furthermore, Plaintiffs asserted that “New 
Mexico’s constitution and statutes mandating protection of the state’s natural 
resources and the environment leave no doubt that the atmosphere is 
squarely within the domain of the public trust.”51  Plaintiffs alleged that 
due to the rising threat of climate change in New Mexico, government 
action was necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change impacts to New 
Mexico’s water resources, infrastructure, agriculture, natural systems, 
outdoor recreation and related tourism, environmental quality and health 
and environmental justice and native peoples.52 Because New Mexico 
 
 47.  N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21. 
 48.  See Sanders-Reed, supra note 44. 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  See id. 
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currently has no regulatory structure in place to protect its citizens from 
the detrimental impacts of climate change, Plaintiffs alleged that the 
government is in violation of the public trust doctrine. Plaintiffs prayed 
that the Court declare the State’s fiduciary duty to protect the atmosphere that 
it holds in trust for the benefit of the citizens of New Mexico.53 
The New Mexico District Court initially dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint 
for failure to make substantive allegations, but “state[d] the belief that 
there is a place for the public trust and provided leave for the Plaintiffs to 
amend their Complaint.”54 The court also provided for the contours of an 
amended complaint and held that if Plaintiffs could show that the New 
Mexico legislature and government agencies had been ignoring the 
atmosphere, the Court would apply the public trust doctrine to the 
atmosphere.55  Plaintiffs amended their complaint, asserting that the Governor 
of New Mexico, Susana Martinez (“Governor Martinez”), actively worked 
to repeal the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board’s (“EIB”) 
that established GHG emissions reduction regulations.56 The EIB’s regulations 
required annual reporting of GHG emissions to the New Mexico 
Environmental Department (“NMED”).57 
In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that: (i) Governor Martinez 
announced that she would keep New Mexico from joining a regional cap-
and-trade program aimed at reducing GHG emissions; (ii) the NMED 
repealed the EIB’s GHG emissions reduction regulations; (iii) the state 
preferred climate change issues to be addressed at the Federal level due to 
the increased operating costs associated with enforcing EIB’s regulations; 
(iv) Governor Martinez and the State of New Mexico “have no 
comprehensive plan to reduce the State’s [GHG] emissions or otherwise 
mitigate its contribution to climate change;” (v) Governor Martinez failed 
“to prevent substantial impairment to the atmosphere and failed to 
effectively implement and enforce the [public trust] laws under her 
jurisdiction; (vi) the State, as trustee, “holds all natural resources within 
the State’s borders, including the atmosphere, in trust for the people of 
New Mexico;” and (vii) the State “failed in its fiduciary duty to recognize 
 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  See id. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See id. 
 57.  See id. 
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and prevent substantial impairment to the atmospheric public trust 
resource.”58 
B.  New Mexico’s 2010 Environmental Regulations 
Pursuant to the New Mexico Air Quality Control Act (“AQCA”), the 
New Mexico EIB became the state government agency charged with the 
responsibility of regulating and protecting the atmosphere.59 On November 
2, 2010, the EIB enacted the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, which 
established GHG reduction requirements and focused on the reduction of 
carbon dioxide emissions.60 The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program 
applied to stationary sources that emitted at least 25,000 metric tons of 
carbon dioxide, mainly coal and gas fired power plants, and oil and gas 
operations, and required these facilities to reduce their emissions by 3% 
per year.61 Additionally, the EIB enacted a cap-and-trade program as part 
of their participation in the Western Climate Initiative.62 This program sought 
to create a carbon market in New Mexico, and shared the EIB’s ultimate 
goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions.63 AQCA determined a 
procedure for promulgating the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program and 
cap-and-trade program’s (collectively “the Programs”) regulations. The 
Programs specified that any implementation would be subject to public 
hearing and notice.64 Particularly, AQCA allowed “all interested persons 
reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments orally or in 
writing, and to examine witnesses testifying at the hearing.”65 
Immediately following the enactment of these regulations, the New 
Mexico Oil and Gas Association, the Independent Petroleum Association of 
New Mexico, the City of Farmington and the Farmington Electric Utility 
System appealed the EIB’s regulatory requirements to the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals.66 The Court granted the appeal and required the EIB to 
review their regulatory scheme.67 In December of 2010, Governor 
Martinez appointed new members to the EIB.68 After the EIB balanced 
the health, welfare, and interest of the public against the technical  
 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-1-8 (2014). 
 60.  N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 20.2.100 (West 2014). 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 20.2.350 (West 2011). 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-1-8, supra note 59, at 3. 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  Susan Montoya Bryan, Petitions Filed to Repeal NM GHG Rules, BLOOMBERG 
BUS.WK., July 21, 2011, at 1. 
 67.  See id. 
 68.  See id. 
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practicability and economic reasonableness of the Programs, the NMED 
petitioned the new EIB to repeal the regulations.69 To the State, it seemed as 
if the NMED and EIB agreed that the Programs’ costs far outweighed  
any benefits to New Mexico residents. 
By June of 2012, the Programs were repealed by the EIB, leaving the 
state with no means of measuring, regulating, reporting, or verifying the 
amount of GHGs in the atmosphere. The EIB’s decision to repeal also left 
the state with no existing statutory framework for the regulation of the 
atmosphere.70 
C.  Defendant’s Response and Motion to Dismiss 
In response to Plaintiff’s allegations, the State of New Mexico moved 
to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint, making the following arguments: 
first, the State contended that the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s original 
complaint created a heavy burden of proof on Plaintiff.71 The State argued 
that without some indication that the citizens of New Mexico were being 
excluded from the legislative or administrative political process, the Court 
may not bypass and override the current political process as set forth in New 
Mexico’s Constitution.72 Thus, the State contended that under the Court’s 
instruction, Plaintiff must prove that the political process of electing a 
legislative body to be held responsible for enacting a regulatory scheme to 
protect the atmosphere had gone astray.73  Second, the State argued that 
the duty and authority to protect the State’s natural resources lies within 
the legislature, not the judiciary.74 Lastly, the State contends that under 
New Mexico’s Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted and that he relief sought is improper in 
a public trust case because it goes beyond the criteria set by the court.”75 
  
 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 20.2.100, supra note 60. 
 71.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Sanders v. Martinez, No. D010CV20111514, 
2012 WL 8898920 (N.M. Dist., Mar. 30, 2012). 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  See id. 
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1.  Defendants Argued That Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Showing That 
New Mexico Citizens Were Excluded From the Legislative Process 
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs must bear the burden of proving that 
New Mexico’s legislature and environmental agencies ignored the 
atmosphere.76 To this end, Defendants contend: 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint contains absolutely no factual allegations that the 
legislature failed to enact a statutory scheme to deal with the atmosphere or that 
the Environmental Improvement Board (“EIB”), the agency assigned to deal with 
the quality of the atmosphere, NMSA 1978 § 74-2-5, was not attempting to follow 
the statutory scheme, or that either the legislature or the EIB had failed to act in 
an open and inclusive manner.”77 
Thus, Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to show that the State 
ignored the atmosphere. Instead of denying the factual allegations against 
Governor Martinez and her attempts to block the EIB’s GHG emissions 
regulations, Defendants instead argued that Governor Martinez’s position in 
office is a consequence of an election by the citizens, and that the political 
process in New Mexico is alive and well.78 Defendants justified their 
support for the EIB’s repeal of the GHG emissions regulations while 
simultaneously contending that the EIB continued to follow the statutory 
scheme enacted by the New Mexico legislature.79  Defendants accomplished 
this by evidencing the fact that Plaintiff participated in open EIB proceedings 
to oppose the repeal of the regulations.80 Thus, Defendants explained, 
because of Plaintiff’s participation in proceedings to oppose the EIB’s 
repeal, and the EIB’s considerations of the people’s concerns, the citizens of 
New Mexico could not have been excluded from the political process.81 
2.  Defendants Argued That the Legislature has the Exclusive Authority 
to Regulate the Atmosphere; Therefore, the District Court Lacked 
Jurisdiction in the Matter 
Defendants additionally contended that any finding of the District Court of 
New Mexico would undermine the separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative, and judicial bodies of the New Mexico government.82 
Defendants argued that the New Mexico Constitution grants exclusive 
 
 76.  See id. 
 77.  See id. 
 78.  See id. 
 79.  See id. 
 80.  See id. 
 81.  See id. 
 82.  See id. 
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authority to protect the natural resources of New Mexico to the legislature.83 
By referring the State Constitution, Defendants attempted to absolve 
themselves of all liability from Plaintiffs’ injury.84 Defendants further 
contended that since “[p]ersons seeking GHG regulation were able to 
petition for rulemaking . . . [and] appeal to the Court of Appeals . . . [and] to 
petition the EIB to repeal the regulations,” the District Court is not an 
appropriate venue to address their concerns.85 Therefore, Defendants held 
that an alternative venue was available for citizens to review the EIB’s 
decision to repeal their GHG emissions regulations—a well-established 
political process.86 As such, Defendants argued that dismissal of Plaintiff’s 
amended complaint is proper.87 
3.  Defendants Argued That Plaintiffs Failed to State a Claim for                   
Which Relief May be Granted 
Finally, Defendants argued that dismissal of a legal claim is appropriate 
where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.88 
Defendants first summarized the court’s language used in dismissing 
Plaintiff’s original complaint: that “[it] do[es] not believe, if adopted, that 
the public trust doctrine would result in more than the court telling a State 
agency, or the State as whole, to consider certain things.”89 Here, 
Plaintiffs sought for the Court to make broad declarations regarding the state’s 
fiduciary duties and to identify a breach of public trust.  However, because 
Plaintiffs failed to show convincing evidence that some political process 
had gone astray, any such declaration would be outside the scope of 
allowable relief.90 Lastly, Defendants argued that even if the District court 
were to consider another amended complaint pleading a substantive public 
trust issue, it lacks jurisdiction to grant Plaintiffs any of the forms of relief 
for which they pray, and that the action cannot be furthered.91 
 
 83.  See id.  The language of the New Mexico Constitution states, “The legislature 
shall provide for control of pollution and control of despoilment of the air.” N.M. CONST. 
art. XX, § 21, supra note 43. 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  See Sanders, supra note 71. 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See id. 
 88.  See id. 
 89.  See id. 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  See id. 
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D.  Supplemental Responses in Litigation 
In response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs successfully 
invalidated many of Defendants’ assertions.92 First, Plaintiffs contended 
that their Amended Complaint comported with the instruction by the 
District Court, which required Plaintiffs to show: 
[that] the legislature had failed to enact a statutory scheme to deal with the 
atmosphere, [that] the agency assigned to deal with the atmosphere was not 
following an existing statutory scheme, or [that] the public was excluded from 
the legislative or administrative process.93 
Plaintiffs asserted that their Amended Complaint was consistent with the 
court’s direction by contending that the State’s decision to repeal its existing 
regulatory scheme to regulate GHG emissions without considering its 
negative impact on the public qualifies as a failure to protect the 
atmosphere as a resource within the public trust.94 Plaintiffs also clarified that 
they were not asking the Court to dictate standards for GHG emissions 
regulations, nor were they asking the State to address the issue of climate 
change, but instead asked the Court to direct the State to analyze the degree 
of impairment that unlimited GHG emissions has on the atmosphere in 
New Mexico.95 Thus, Plaintiffs asserted that their prayer for relief is 
appropriate.96 Furthermore, Plaintiffs contended that granting a motion for 
dismissal is inappropriate because the standard for dismissal is very 
high.97 According to the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, the court 
must “accept all well-pled factual allegations as true and resolve all doubts in 
favor of the sufficiency of the complaint.”98 On that basis, Plaintiffs urged 
the court to deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.99 
Plaintiffs justified their allegations of a cognizable public trust claim by 
claiming that the State actively worked to dismantle the existing 
regulatory scheme for controlling GHG emissions by repealing the EIB’s 
GHG emissions regulations and subsequently failing to implement other 
substantive measures to address climate change.100 Plaintiffs further alleged 
that this failure to regulate indicates that the “State is ‘ignoring the 
atmosphere,’ a situation which [the] Court suggested would lead the New 
 
 92.  Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Sanders v. Martinez, No.  
D0101CV201101514, 2012 WL 8525572 (N.M. Dist., Apr. 16, 2012). 
 93.  See id. 
 94.  See id. 
 95.  See id. 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  N.M. R. DIST. CT RCP RULE 1-012. 
 99.  See Sanders, supra note 92. 
 100.  See id. 
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Mexico Supreme Court to ‘apply the public trust doctrine  to the 
atmosphere.’”101 Additionally, Plaintiffs emphasized the point that New 
Mexico has no existing legal framework, policy, or plan to protect the 
atmosphere from the harmful effects of unlimited and unregulated GHG 
emissions.102 Defendants claimed that the political process in New Mexico 
has not gone astray because of the public’s participation in both the EIB 
GHG emissions regulations proceedings as well as its political elections 
process to elect Governor Martinez. Plaintiffs combated this argument by 
contending that the political process has gone astray substantively as a 
result of the State’s removal of all existing protections  for the 
atmosphere.103 Therefore, by alleging that the State had failed to enact a 
statutory scheme to deal with the atmosphere, Plaintiff’s Amended 
Complaint fell within the Court’s directive, and created a cognizable 
public trust claim, not subject to dismissal by the Court.104 
Lastly, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory 
relief does not ask the Court to assess the degree of impact GHG 
emissions have on the atmosphere, or to assess the future of atmospheric 
impairment, but instead to determine Plaintiffs’ “rights, status, and other 
legal relations” under the Public Trust Doctrine in New Mexico.”105 Since 
the Court maintains jurisdiction over common law claims, Plaintiffs contend 
that seeking resolution of their public trust claim falls within  the 
jurisdictional requirements for declaratory judgment under New Mexico’s 
Declaratory Judgment Act.106 Instead of asking the Court to mandate that 
the State adopt a specific plan to regulate GHG emissions in response to 
the threat of climate change, Plaintiffs clarify that they only request that 
the Court order the State to consider “the degree of impairment to the 
atmosphere from current GHG levels in New Mexico and the concomitant 
climate change impacts based on current climate change science.”107 
 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  See id. 
 103.  See id. 
 104.  See id. 
 105.  See id. 
 106.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-6-2 (West) 
 107.  See Sanders, supra note 92. 
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E.  Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment 
In January of 2013, after the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, Defendants filed an Answer asserting a variety of affirmative 
defenses to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.108 Subsequent to their 
Answer, Defendants moved for summary judgment to assert their lack of 
liability for the protection of the atmosphere by making three primary 
arguments, some which were iterated in their Motion to Dismiss: (1) Air 
quality should be regulated by the EIB, because the State legislature 
determined that it was the government agency “charged with adopting, 
promulgating, publishing, amending, and repealing regulations consistent 
with the Air Quality Control Act,” and that the Court of Appeals is charged 
with reviewing the support for the factual determinations of the EIB under 
statute, therefore the District Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to review 
the EIB’s actions; (2) Plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with the EIB’s specific 
GHG emissions regulations or its implementation thereof does not 
indicate that the political process somehow malfunctioned “in such a way 
as to impermissible impede the obligations of state government to protect 
the air quality;” (3) Common law is subordinate to the New Mexico 
Constitution.109  Defendants emphasized that the New Mexico Constitution 
tasks the legislature, not the judiciary, with controlling the pollution and 
despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources,  (emphasis 
added).110  Therefore, Defendants ultimately argued that any judicial 
declaration would be an intrusion into the statutory scheme enacted by the 
legislature.111 
To further bolster their motion, Defendants also argued that even if the 
EIB had not repealed their GHG emissions regulations, there would be no 
discernible effect on rising temperatures in New Mexico.112 Defendants 
concluded that the maintenance of the atmosphere through stricter 
regulation on GHG emissions do not serve any public benefit. 113 
Furthermore, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs could not demonstrate 
that any degree of regulation of GHG emissions in New Mexico would 
have any impact on global climate change.114  Therefore, Defendants 
concluded that the public trust doctrine should not apply, and that the 
 
 108.  Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Sanders v. Martinez, No. 
D0101CV201101514, 2012 WL 8898922 (N.M. Dist., Aug. 15, 2012). 
 109.  See id. 
 110.  See id. 
 111.  See id. 
 112.  See id. 
 113.  See id. 
 114.  See id. 
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government has no duty to protect the atmosphere.115 Finally, Defendants 
contended that even if the public trust doctrine were operative in New 
Mexico, the State had already fulfilled any duty it had to protect the 
atmosphere by designating the EIB to research and implement  GHG 
emissions regulations.116 Defendants referenced that the publicly held 
deliberations for the regulation of GHG emissions, and the fact that the 
decision to repeal the regulations was based on support of expert witnesses. 
Defendants concluded that any duty to the public was effectively fulfilled.117 
Defendants ultimately attributed the decision to repeal the regulations to 
the economic job losses the State would have incurred had the regulations 
been implemented.118 
In February 2013, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, reiterated 
claims in prior motions, and made the following key arguments: (1) “[T]he 
State has breached its obligation as trustee of the atmosphere. Because it 
is undisputed that the State is not acting to protect the atmosphere, it is 
undisputed that the State has violated the Public Trust Doctrine.” (2) 
While climate change is a global issue that requires supplemental action 
outside the State’s control, this “does not release the agency from the duty of 
assessing the effects of its actions on global warming.” (3) The State 
cannot defer liability to the EPA’s regulatory program for GHG emissions, 
because it is not comprehensive.119 Thus, Plaintiffs concluded that the 
State should not be excused from compliance with the public trust doctrine.120 
F.  Result and Grounds for Appeal 
In June 2013, the District Court of New Mexico heard oral arguments 
based on Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.  
The District Court issued a trial order granting Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment.121 The Court found that the State produced a more 
compelling argument to the status of the atmospheric trust in New 
Mexico, and determined that the judiciary could not bypass the political 
 
 115.  See id. 
 116.  See id. 
 117.  See id. 
 118.  See id. 
 119.  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Sanders v. Martinez, No. 
D0101CV201101514, 2012 WL 4510703 (N.M. Dist., Feb. 19, 2013). 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment . Sanders v. 
Martinez, No. D0101CV201101514, 2012 WL 4094867 (N.M. Dist., Jul. 4, 2013). 
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process if there was no specific indication that the political process had 
gone astray.122 Furthermore, the Court sided with the Defendants’ 
argument that the New Mexico EIB’s decision-making process was open 
to the public. Therefore the Plaintiffs’ chance to participate in its findings had 
not been denied.123 The New Mexico District Court also made the 
following important conclusion: 
[T]he State may compromise public rights in the resource only when the decision is 
made with a level of openness, diligence, and foresight that is commensurate with 
the high priorities that the rights command under the laws of the State.124 
Although the litigation in New Mexico failed to compel the District 
Court to grant Plaintiffs’ requested relief, the fact that their Complaint 
survived various motions for dismissal shows legitimacy in their claim 
that the public trust doctrine could be expanded to include the atmosphere. In 
no way did the New Mexico District Court issue a finding that 
invalidated the expansion of the public trust doctrine’s potential, nor did 
it deny that the language in the New Mexico Constitution limited the duty 
to protect the atmosphere strictly to the legislature. Instead, the Court’s 
ruling reiterated that if Plaintiffs could show: (i) an indication that a New 
Mexico political process had gone astray; (ii) that a State agency was 
failing to apply the statutory scheme; or (iii) that members of the public 
were excluded from the processes, their claim would have sufficient 
grounds to be honored.125 
Even though the public was included in the State’s decision to repeal 
the EIB regulations, Plaintiffs may still structure an appeal based on the 
State’s failure to enact an existing statutory scheme to protect the atmosphere. 
To succeed on appeal, Plaintiffs’ focus must shift to Defendants’ failure 
to carry out the EIB’s GHG Reduction Program.  The appeal should also 
highlight the Program’s potential to significantly decrease the amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the State’s lackluster attempt to 
enforce the EIB’s GHG emissions reporting standards. In addition, 
Plaintiffs should note the fact that the State sought immediate review of 
the new EIB GHG regulations, appointed new EIB members, and repealed 
the programs in place due to mere administrative inconveniences. By 
alleging that the State actively worked to nullify the Program and failed 
to enforce the statutory scheme, Plaintiffs should be able to show an 
identifiable resulting injury. Surely, such a factual showing might compel an 
 
 122.  See id. 
 123.  See id. 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  See id. 
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appellate level court to find “an indication that . . . the agency was not 
attempting to apply the statutory scheme.”126 
However, Plaintiffs may also face difficulty on appeal, as an appeal may 
be denied by New Mexico’s appellate court if New Mexico’s administrative 
law has a principal of deference similar to federal administrative law, as 
set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
(“Chevron”).  In Chevron, the Supreme Court held: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute. . . [A] court may 
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for reasonable 
interpretation made by the administrator of agency.127 
In order for the Chevron principle of deference to apply in this 
illustration, the New Mexico Constitution must be ambiguous, and the 
drafters must have explicitly left a gap for the authorized agency (the EIB) 
to fill. Since the New Mexico Constitution provides that the duty to 
protect the atmosphere lies in the legislature but does not explicitly 
provide for the way in which the atmosphere should be protected, 
Defendants could argue that the New Mexico Constitution drafters explicitly 
left a Chevron gap in its language. However, since the legislature delegated 
the EIB as the sole authority to regulate and protect the environment, 
the EIB is the agency charged with interpreting New Mexico’s 
Constitutional provision, provided that their interpretation is reasonable 
under the statute. If reasonable, the court must give deference to the EIB’s 
interpretation of the Constitutional language, and the EIB’s decision not 
to regulate may be valid. 
However, Plaintiffs would have two available avenues to refute this 
argument. First, Plaintiffs could show that the EIB’s decision to repeal the 
regulations left the state with no statutory scheme to regulate GHG 
emissions or reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the air. The language in 
the New Mexico Constitution explicitly provides that the legislature shall 
control the pollution and despoilment of the air. This allows Plaintiffs to 
argue that having no statutory scheme in place to combat the threat of 
climate change effectively despoils the air. An appellate court would 
likely find this decision to be unreasonable or impermissible, based on its 
 
 126.  See id. 
 127.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
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interpretation of the New Mexico Constitution. This would negate the 
applicability of the Chevron deference principle and allow the court to 
reinterpret the constitutional language on appeal. 
Second, Plaintiffs could assert that the EIB’s decision to repeal the 
GHG reduction regulations was unjustified and entirely at odds with the 
New Mexico Constitution. Chevron provides that an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute in question must not be “arbitrary, capricious or manifestly 
contrary” to the statute in question. Even though Chevron would forbid 
an appellate court to substitute its own construction of the New Mexico 
Constitution for the EIB’s reasonable interpretation, it would have the 
power to grant Plaintiffs’ appeal and require the administrator of the EIB 
to reconsider and reinterpret the Constitution’s intent. In order to prove 
that the EIB’s decision to repeal the regulations was “arbitrary, capricious 
or manifestly contrary” to the New Mexico Constitution, Plaintiffs must 
show that the EIB went against the will of the public, the  primary 
beneficiary of the Constitution. Because Plaintiffs were present at these 
EIB hearings and indeed voiced their concerns for GHG emissions and 
climate change, it is clear that there was significant public interest in 
reducing the State’s GHG emissions. However, despite public concern 
about the threat of climate change, the State determined that the high 
administrative costs to enforce the EIB’s regulations outweighed any clear 
and present threat to the public. Instead of considering their constituents’ 
legitimate interests in reducing GHG emissions, the EIB presented experts 
who testified that any reduction in GHG emissions would not have a direct 
impact on the rise in global temperature. By allowing this expert testimony 
to be a determinative factor in their decision to repeal, the EIB effectively 
ignored the Plaintiffs’ contributions to the proceedings. Thus, Plaintiffs 
can craft a strong appeal asserting that the decision to repeal the EIB 
regulations was, arbitrary, capricious and manifestly contrary to the New 
Mexico Constitution. 
Plaintiffs filed an appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals on July 
24, 2013, the results of which are still pending. The trial court documents 
on the grounds of the appeal have not yet been released. At this point, 
Sanders v. Martinez is the closest any plaintiff has reached to achieving 
success in urging the government to protect the atmosphere by expanding 
the public trust. Sanders v. Martinez is a pivotal and potentially influential 
case for atmospheric trust litigation because it has viable grounds for appeal. 
Though unsuccessful, the case still provides a framework for future 
atmospheric trust claims so that others injured by the increase in global 
temperature can pursue civil litigation in their own states. Even though it 
is an uphill battle to include the atmosphere in the public trust by means 
of civil litigation, there is great potential for successful future claims. As 
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such, atmospheric trust litigation serves as an effective means to force 
governments to address the issue of climate change. 
V.  THE FUTURE OF ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION 
While litigation to expand the public trust doctrine’s reach to encompass 
the atmosphere in New Mexico provided no avail for addressing climate 
change by means of the judiciary, the future of atmospheric trust litigation 
still remains bright. Approximately seven states are actively pursuing 
litigation similar to that of New Mexico. Also, environmental organizations 
such as Our Children’s Trust, are helping to pave the way to promulgate 
civil litigation under the public trust doctrine as a viable legal mechanism 
to coerce governments into addressing the ongoing threat of climate 
change.128 Our Children’s Trust initiated the TRUST Campaign, a legal 
effort in 50 states against the federal government on behalf of youth.129 
The campaign brings suit under the public trust doctrine to compel 
governments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions that will counter the 
negative impacts of climate change.130 The Sanders case is one of the 
campaign’s most recent filings. The TRUST Campaign also brought civil 
litigation to the appellate level in Alaska, Oregon, and Washington. These 
states’ courts of appeals are scheduled to review decisions that have denied 
the states’ duty to protect the atmosphere as part of the public trust.131 The 
courts of appeals will reevaluate the applicability of the public trust doctrine 
as operative within their states, consider the possibility of its expansion, 
and determine whether the district court erred in their prior determination.132 
Lastly, a notable atmospheric trust case was recently litigated in the 
state of Texas, where a Texas trial court determined that the atmosphere 
is included within the state’s public trust, and the state bears the responsibility 
to preserve and protect it for future generations.133 In this 2012 case, 
plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality’s (“TCEQ”) order denying a petition for the reduction of carbon 
dioxide emissions within the state. Plaintiffs contended that according to 
 
 128.  LEGAL ACTION, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/legal (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 129.  See id. 
 130.  See id. 
 131.  See id. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  Bonsier-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 
WL 3164561, at *1–2 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2012). 
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Texas Health and Safety Code Section 382.0205, the TCEQ had the “legal 
authority to control air contaminants against the adverse effects of climate 
changes, including global warming,” and sought for the court to review 
TCEQ’s denial.134 Plaintiffs made a similar claim as the New Mexico 
plaintiffs, and contended that the state breached its duty to protect the 
atmosphere under the common law public trust doctrine.135 While the trial 
court ultimately denied Plaintiffs’ petition and ruled that the state had not 
breached their duty, the trial court did determine that the scope of the 
Texas public trust doctrine would be expanded to include the atmosphere.136 
The Texas Environmental Protection Division, on behalf of the state, 
wrote a letter to the trial court claiming that the judge’s expansion of the 
public trust doctrine was an impermissible advisory opinion, and sought 
an appeal of the determination.137 The state contended that Plaintiffs did 
not bring a valid claim for declaratory relief, and that even if Plaintiffs’ 
suit was valid, the declaration granted must resolve the real controversy 
between the parties.138 The declaration that the public trust doctrine 
includes the atmosphere would not resolve the parties’ dispute because 
the doctrine’s scope was not the entire concern of the petition. Thus the 
State contends that the court’s determination has no authority.139 
Bonser-Lain v. TCEQ has helped pave the way for the future of the 
atmospheric trust by exemplifying that even in losing cases where the 
court does not rule in the plaintiff’s favor, the public trust may still be 
expanded to include the atmosphere. The fact that Texas is still petitioning 
for an appeal against the trial court’s expansion of the doctrine, despite 
their win in Bonser-Lain v. TCEQ, shows that the court’s determination is 
crucial to the future of the environmental and atmospheric regulation in 
Texas. This case showcases that civil litigation under the common law 
public trust doctrine is a viable legal mechanism to promulgate state 
governments to address climate change concerns more adequately. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As Professor Charles Wilkinson explains, “The public trust doctrine is 
rooted in the precept that some resources are so central to the well-being 
of the community that they must be protected by distinctive, judge-made 
 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  See id. 
 137.  See Bonser-Lain, supra note 133. 
 138.  See id. 
 139.  See id. 
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principles.”140 Because a healthy and habitable atmosphere is essential to 
the survival of the human race, it is imperative that the public trust doctrine 
be interpreted in a way to include the atmosphere within its scope. Civil 
litigation is an effective legal mechanism to expand the public trust 
doctrine’s scope by way of the judiciary. Once a state judiciary can 
determine the applicability of the public trust doctrine to the Earth’s 
atmosphere, it can affirm its government’s fiduciary responsibility to 
regulate the substances in the atmosphere. This will protect Earth’s 
habitability, and will be an appropriate way to sufficiently address climate 
change, at least at the state level. By utilizing civil litigation as a legal 
mechanism to coerce governments into regulating excessive anthropogenic 
GHG emissions, and ultimately in addressing and combating the harmful 
effects of climate change, the Earth’s atmosphere can be protected for 
























 140.  Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional 
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. REV. 425 (1989). 
